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Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum
mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open
loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system.
This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience
from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey
quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number
generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how
the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols,
breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important
to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to
future applications.
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Common aims in cryptography are to guarantee con-
fidentiality, integrity, and authentication of information.
Some of the conventional cryptography based on com-
putational complexity might be broken by a powerful
quantum computer [1]. However, quantum cryptogra-
phy, where security rests on the laws of quantum mechan-
ics, is one way to achieve information-theoretic security.
Among the quantum cryptographic protocols, quantum
key distribution (QKD) has become theoretically mature
and technically practical. Inspired by the idea of QKD
and taking advantage of QKD implementations, other
quantum cryptographic primitives have gradually been
developed, such as quantum coin tossing, quantum se-
cret sharing, and quantum digital signatures [2–4]. For
each primitive, different protocols have been proposed,
and even realized by current technology [5–7].
However, there is a non-negligible gap between the-
ory and practice in QKD: imperfections in devices create
various loopholes that compromise the protocol’s secu-
rity [8–14]. Practical security issues might also occur in
the realization of other quantum cryptographic protocols.
In theory, the protocols are unconditionally secure, but
the security might not be guaranteed in practice due to
imperfections of devices. Investigating device imperfec-
tions and system loopholes in QKD has taken more than
a decade, and is still in progress. The experience gained
from QKD will be helpful in finding possible loopholes in
other implementations of quantum cryptographic proto-
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cols, because they use similar optical components. This
enhances the practical security of quantum cryptography.
The vulnerability of quantum coin-tossing and non-
loophole-free Bell testing has previously been demon-
strated [20, 21], using imperfections in their specific
experimental implementations to remove the protocol’s
quantum advantages. In this Article, we survey five
quantum cryptographic primitives as examples to inves-
tigate practical security threats in their implementation.
The primitives are quantum digital signatures (QDS),
quantum secret sharing (QSS), source-independent quan-
tum random number generation (SI QRNG), quantum
secure direct communication (QSDC), and blind quan-
tum computing (BQC). Based on attacks known to exist
for QKD, we propose potential attacks on these primi-
tives. The attacks may compromise the security of prac-
tical quantum cryptographic systems, without making
the legitimate participants abort the cryptographic pro-
tocols. We summarize potential imperfections and bro-
ken security properties for all five primitives in Table I.
Details for each primitive are explained in Secs. II to VI.
Each of these sections contains two parts: in subsection A
we recap the protocol, and in subsection B we propose
the attacks on its implementation. Countermeasures are
discussed in Sec. VII. We conclude in Sec. VIII. Please
note that this study is merely a starting point present-
ing a broad overview. Detailed analysis of each imple-
mentation imperfection should be done in the future, as
technological implementations of the protocols mature.
In this Article, we focus on the implementation secu-
rity of the demonstrations. We also remark that while
most of these quantum cryptographic schemes have ad-
vantages over “classical” schemes, for some of these pro-
tocols, their practical usefulness is less clear, and strict
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2TABLE I. Summary of potential attacks in implementations of quantum cryptographic protocols. The table lists broken
security properties for five primitives: two different protocols for quantum digital signatures (QDS), two different protocols
for quantum secret sharing (QSS), source-independent quantum random number generation (SI QRNG), quantum secure di-
rect communication (QSDC), and blind quantum computing (BQC). “–” means the attack is not applicable. See text for details.
Protocol
Attack Source
side channel
Wavelength-dependent
attack
Detector control
attack
Trojan-horse
attack
QDS
Identical-state-sharing [15] Unforgeability Unforgeability Unforgeability –
Different-state-sharing [6] – – Unforgeability Unforgeability
QSS
Entanglement-based [16] – – Confidentiality –
Single-qubit [5] – – – Confidentiality
SI QRNG [17] – Randomness Randomness –
QSDC [18] – – Confidentiality Confidentiality
BQC [19] Confidentiality – – Confidentiality
security proofs may still be under development. For ex-
ample, it is not always clear what practical advantage all
protocols for QSS offer, over protocols based on secret
shared keys followed by a “classical” protocol for secret
sharing. Similarly, for QSDC, one would need to moti-
vate the usefulness of direct communication, as opposed
to establishing secret shared keys using standard QKD,
followed by encryption using these keys. Discussing these
aspects is however outside the scope of our study.
II. QUANTUM DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Digital signatures are an important primitive in cryp-
tography. Specifically, three security properties are re-
quired for signatures: unforgeability, nonrepudiation,
and transferability [22]. Unforgeability guarantees a
unique message signer, so no one else is able to forge
a valid signature. Nonrepudiation requires that once
a message is signed, the signer cannot deny the signa-
ture. Transferability means that a recipient who accepts
a message can be sure that if the message is forwarded,
another recipient will also accept the message, except
with a probability that can be made arbitrarily low.
QDS based on laws of quantum physics is able to satisfy
these requirements, and achieve information-theoretic se-
curity [4]. Unconditionally secure signatures are also pos-
sible based on shared secret keys [22–25], and the scaling
of secret key length with respect to message length can be
more favorable than for quantum signatures. The secret
shared key could be generated by quantum key distribu-
tion, but otherwise these schemes remain entirely “classi-
cal”. On the other hand, the error rate threshold can be
less strict for quantum digital signatures than for quan-
tum key distribution to distill shared secret keys [26].
References 26 and 27 propose QDS protocols via in-
secure quantum channels, which later have been imple-
mented [6, 15]. A significant difference between these two
protocols is the stage of quantum state distribution. In
Ref. 27, Alice sends the same quantum states to Bob and
Charlie, while in Ref. 26, Bob and Charlie individually
send different quantum states to Alice.
Both protocols are briefly introduced in the next sub-
section. A reader familiar with protocol implementation
can, of course, skip to subsection B, where we discuss
vulnerabilities.
A. Protocol and implementation
1. Identical-state-sharing
Reference 27 proposes a QDS protocol with a
quantum-state sender, Alice, and two quantum-state re-
ceivers, Bob and Charlie. This protocol has been imple-
mented over a distance of 102 km [15] as shown in Fig. 1.
The protocol consists of two stages, a quantum stage, and
a signing stage. In the quantum stage, for each future 1-
bit message m = 0 or m = 1, Alice employs weak coher-
ent states to randomly prepare two identical sequences
of qubit states, and every individual state is in one of the
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) polarization states |H〉,
|V 〉, |+〉 and |−〉 [2]. In addition, the decoy-state pro-
tocol [28] is used to randomly modulate the mean pho-
ton numbers of the weak coherent states, protecting the
system from photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks [29].
Then one copy of the sequence is sent to Bob, and one
copy to Charlie. A beam splitter is used to randomly
and independently select the X or Z basis to measure
the received states.
In a sifting phase, Bob and Charlie announce in which
slots they obtain detections. For each detection slot, Al-
ice then announces two nonorthogonal states from differ-
ent bases, for example, |H〉 and |+〉. One of them is the
real state she sent. If Bob (Charlie) obtains a measure-
ment result corresponding to a state that is orthogonal
to one of the states Alice announced, such as |V 〉, then
Bob (Charlie) conclusively knows that it is the other an-
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup for QDS implemented by H.-L.
Yin and his coworkers (reprinted from Ref. 15). Alice first
prepares two pairs of pairs of horizontally (H) and vertically
(V) polarized photons using two pairs of lasers followed by
polarization beam splitters (PBS). One pair of H and V po-
larized photons are then rotated pi/4 by a pi/4 rotation beam
splitter (pi
4
RBS), becoming states |+〉 and |−〉. The variation
in amplitude for the decoy states is implemented by an elec-
trical variable optical attenuator (EVOA). Bob and Charlie
each randomly choose one of two bases to detect the incom-
ing states. Here, DWDM denotes a dense wavelength divi-
sion multiplexer, BS denotes a beam splitter, EPC denotes
an electric polarization controller, SNSPD denotes a super-
conducting nanowire single-photon detector, SynL denotes a
synchronization laser, FPGA denotes a field programmable
gate array.
nounced state, |+〉.
In the next stage, the signing stage, only classical pro-
cessing takes place. It starts by announcing some of the
states shared between Alice and Bob (Charlie) during the
quantum stage to calculate an authentication threshold
Ta (Tv) for Bob (Charlie). The unannounced states form
strings denoted as SAm for Alice, SBm for Bob and SCm
for Charlie, and will be used for the digital signature. To
send a signed 1-bit message m, Alice sends the message
and the corresponding data string, (m, SAm), to one of
the recipients, say, Bob. Bob will accept this message if
the mismatch rate of sifted bits between SAm and SBm
is less than Ta. If Bob wishes to forward the message to
Charlie, he forwards (m, SAm) to Charlie. Charlie will
accept this message as well if the mismatch rate of the
sifted bits between SAm and SCm is less than Tv.
2. Different-state-sharing
Reference 26 proposes another quantum digital signa-
ture protocol that sends different quantum states from
Bob and Charlie to Alice. This protocol has subsequently
been implemented based on an installed differential-
phase-shift (DPS) QKD system, as shown in Fig. 2 [6].
This protocol is also divided into two stages, a distri-
SNSPD1
SNSPD2
FIG. 2. Implementation of QDS by R. J. Collins and his
coworkers, employing a DPS QKD system (reprinted with
permission from Ref. 6), (OSA). Bob and Charlie are the
quantum-state transmitters, and Alice measures the received
states. Here, LD is a laser diode, IM is an intensity modulator,
PM is a phase modulator, ATT is an attenuator, FPGA is a
field programmable gate array, E/O and O/E are electrical-to-
optical and optical-to-electrical converters, SNSPD is a super-
conducting nanowire single-photon detector, DSP is a digital
signal processor, MZI is a Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
bution stage and a messaging stage. In the distribution
stage, Bob and Charlie randomly and independently se-
lect two different n-bit strings. Then, they encode the
bits into quantum states according to the DPS QKD pro-
tocol [30]. For each future message m = 0 or m = 1,
Bob (Charlie) applies a key-generating protocol (KGP)
to share the bit string with Alice. The KGP can be
treated as a partial QKD procedure without error correc-
tion and privacy amplification. Alice and Bob (Charlie)
estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER) by announc-
ing a small part of the shared bits. The remaining L-bit
key is denoted by KBm (K
C
m) at Bob’s (Charlie’s) side. At
Alice’s side, she obtains a signature Sigm = (A
B
m, A
C
m) for
a future message m. Then, to guarantee transferability,
Bob and Charlie randomly forward half of their keys, KBm
and KCm, to each other. This classical bit exchange is en-
crypted by Bob and Charlie using a separate BB84 QKD
system. This way, Alice receives no information on which
bits have been forwarded and which bits have been kept.
From her point of view, a bit she originally shared with
Bob (Charlie) is now equally likely to be retained by Bob
as by Charlie. Bob (Charlie) combine the non-exchanged
part of KBm (K
C
m) and the received part of K
C
m (K
B
m) as
a symmetric key, SBm (S
C
m).
In the messaging stage, Alice signs a message m by
Sigm, and then sends (m,Sigm) to Bob. Bob checks the
mismatch rate between Sigm and S
B
m. If the mismatch
rate is lower than the threshold sa, Bob accepts the mes-
sage. If Bob wishes to forward the message to Charlie,
he forwards (m,Sigm) to Charlie. Charlie also checks the
mismatch rate between Sigm and S
C
m, and accepts the
message if the mismatch rate is lower than the threshold
sv. From Alices point of view, the situation is symmetric
4with respect to Bob and Charlie, so that if Bob accepts
a signature, Charlie must accept it with high probability,
provided acceptance thresholds are chosen correctly and
differently for Bob and Charlie.
B. Hacking
Both protocols have been proven to be information-
theoretically secure, based on different assumptions [26,
27]. In this section, we analyse the security assumptions
for both protocols and illustrate how these assumptions
might be broken. Since QDS realizations are based on
QKD schemes with similar optical components, similar
vulnerabilities exist. That is, some known attacks on
QKD systems are applicable also to the realisations of
quantum digital signatures. In our analysis, we assume
an external attacker Eve who is not a legitimate partici-
pant (Alice, Bob or Charlie) in the QDS protocol.
1. Identical-state-sharing protocol
The unforgeability of this protocol is based on the as-
sumption that given two copies of quantum states, Eve
cannot distinguish between all four states Alice might
send without error before Alice’s declaration [31]. How-
ever, in practice, if Eve were able to discriminate the
states via a side channel, messages could be forged. Sev-
eral side channels exist in the implementation [15], which
could be exploited by Eve to hack it.
Source side channels are useful for Eve to learn the
quantum state prepared by Alice. When quantum states
are prepared by different laser diodes, side channels could
exist both in time and frequency domains [32, 33]. In the
implementation presented in Ref. 15, each laser diode
prepares a specific state, and different laser diodes are
used in a random order. To avoid the spectral side chan-
nel, the implementation controls the difference of the cen-
tral wavelengths for all of these laser diodes in a narrow
range (0.02 nm). Additionally, a dense wavelength di-
vision multiplexer (DWDM) with 100 GHz bandwidth
is used as a filter before the states are sent out. How-
ever, a side channel might exist in another degree of free-
dom. For example, pulse emission time, pulse width and
pulse shape may vary for different laser diodes. These
mismatches give Eve a chance to distinguish different
states [33]. If Eve is able to perfectly distinguish the
quantum states, she could forge a copy of Alice’s signa-
ture and send it to Bob and Charlie. However, usually,
Eve can only partially distinguish the states. She may
choose to perform different types of quantum measure-
ments to maximize her distinguishability. For example,
if Eve makes a measurement that sometimes gives her
higher confidence in the result, such as an unambiguous
quantum measurement, then she could forward a state
only when her measurement has succeeded. Thus, in this
case, if losses are high enough, this strategy may not be
noticed by the legitimate parties.
Measurements are usually more vulnerable than state
preparation. One potential flaw hides in the beam split-
ter situated at the input of Bob’s/Charlie’s subsystem.
The output ratio of the beam splitter might depend on
the wavelength of the incoming light [34], which helps Eve
during the intercept-resend attack. Eve first measures a
state sent by Alice. According to the measurement re-
sult, Eve resends the measured state with a wavelength
that makes the output ratio of the beam splitters become
highly unbalanced, for example, 99:1 or 1:99. Then the
resent state passes through Bob’s/Charlie’s beam splitter
via one output with high probability, likely reaching the
same measurement basis as Eve’s. Thus, Eve, Bob and
Charlie share almost the same detection results. At the
sifting phase, Eve can wiretap the public announcement
and follow the sifting rule described in the protocol, ob-
taining her signature string. After that, if the mismatch
rate between Eve’s and Bob’s (Charlie’s) strings is lower
than Ta (Tv), Eve would be able to pretend to be Alice
and send a signature to Bob (Charlie).
To force Bob and Charlie to obtain the same detection
results as Eve during the intercept-resend attack, another
possible tool is a detector blinding attack [9, 35, 36]. By
applying this attack, Eve might be able to control all
Bob’s measurement results [9, 35, 36]. In this attack,
Eve sends a strong laser to blind Bob’s and Charlie’s
detectors such that they are no longer sensitive to sin-
gle photons, but act as classical optical detectors. Then,
during intercept-resend, Eve resends the measured states
by energy-tailored pulses. The resent pulses trigger Bob’s
detections in the same basis and state as Eve’s. If the
detector blinding attack is possible in this QDS imple-
mentation, Eve could obtain a copy of the bits shared by
Alice and Bob/Charlie after sifting. Thus, Eve could
pretend to be Alice to sign a message. The detec-
tor blinding attack can maintain the normal detection
statistics [37]. Furthermore, in a receiver that uses a
beam splitter to passively choose bases and is vulner-
able to the detector blinding attack, Eve can force a
click with 100% probability [37]. If the digital signature
scheme is built using detectors other than superconduct-
ing nanowire single-photon detectors used in the imple-
mentation shown in Fig. 1, other types of detector-control
attacks may also apply, such as efficiency mismatch [38],
after-gate [39], superlinearity [40], and deadtime [10].
2. Different-state-sharing protocol
In this protocol, unforgeability is based on the security
of the KGP that guarantees d(ABi ,K
B
i ) < d(Eguess,K
B
i )
(with high probability), where d is the Hamming distance
and Eguess is Eve’s attempt at guessing K
B
i [26]. How-
ever, this property could be broken as well, if Eve can
learn the states sent by Bob (Charlie) or forces Alice to
detect the same result as hers. Similar to the previous
5protocol, the implementation might also contain several
loopholes.
Alice’s SNSPDs might be vulnerable to the detector
blinding attack [9, 35, 36]. Similarly to the previous im-
plementation, the SNSPDs might be blinded by a strong
laser. Eve then does intercept-resend and sends Alice
faked states whose power and phase are tailored [41].
Thus, Eve, Alice and Bob (Charlie) share the same bit
string, which means d(ABi ,K
B
i ) = d(Eguess,K
B
i ).
At the source in Bob (Charlie), all the states are
modulated by a phase modulator, which might open
another loophole. The modulation information from
the PM could be eavesdropped by a Trojan-horse at-
tack [12, 20, 42, 43]. In this attack, Eve sends strong light
to Bob (Charlie). The reflected light carries the mod-
ulation information, which could be measured from the
phase difference between injected light and reflected light.
It has been shown that around four reflected photons are
sufficient to read out most of the information [12]. If the
Trojan-horse attack is successful in the QDS system, Eve
could get all Alice’s information: d(Eguess,K
B
i ) could be-
come equal to d(ABi ,K
B
i ).
III. QUANTUM SECRET SHARING
In secret sharing protocols, information is shared
among many parties. The information can be re-
constructed only if groups of parties collaborate.
Information-theoretically secure secret sharing is possible
not only using classical means (e.g., by pairwise shared
keys), but also using quantum methods. Here, we focus
on quantum secret sharing [3]. Two types of quantum
secret sharing schemes, entanglement-based schemes [16]
and single-qubit schemes [5], have been proposed for the
sharing of classical messages. We survey both schemes.
A. Protocol and implementation
1. Entanglement-based protocol
In one scheme for entanglement-based QSS [16], Al-
ice, Bob and Charlie first hold one photon each in a
Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) triplet, which is the
state
|ψ〉ABC =
1√
2
(|H〉A |H〉B |H〉C + |V 〉A |V 〉B |V 〉C). (1)
Then, a projective measurement is performed on each
photon randomly either in the X or Y basis, where the
basis states are given by
|X±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉), |Y±〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± i |V 〉). (2)
The GHZ states can be written as
|ψ〉ABC = 12 [(|X+〉A |X+〉B + |X−〉A |X−〉B) |X+〉C
+ (|X+〉A |X−〉B + |X−〉A |X+〉B) |X−〉C ]. (3)
UV
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FIG. 3. QSS based on entangled states (reprinted from
Ref. 16). (a) QSS system scheme. Ultraviolet (UV) pulses
with a central wavelength of 394 nm are generated by a
LiB3O5 (LBO) crystal. The pulses pass a beta-barium bo-
rate (BBO) crystal twice to generate two pairs of entangled
photons. A photon triggers detection to synchronize GHZ
state detections at Alice, Bob and Charlie. (b) Optical struc-
ture of each receiver unit. Here, BS is a beam splitter, HWP
is a half-wave plate, QWP is a quarter-wave plate, PBS is a
polarization beam splitter, SPD is a single-photon detector.
Thus, if each party measures in the X basis, the measure-
ment results would show perfect correlations. Once any
two measurement results are known, the third measure-
ment result can be predicted with certainty. Similar cor-
relation would be obtained for three other measurement
combinations, XAYBYC , YAXBYC , and YAYBXC . How-
ever, the remaining four basis combinations, XAXBYC ,
XAYBXC , YAXBXC , and YAYBYC , result in uncor-
related measurement results among the three parties.
Thus, they could announce their basis choices to sift the
basis combinations with perfect correlation. After that,
Alice and Bob share their measurement results with each
other to establish Charlie’s key. Thus, a message en-
crypted by Charlie can be decrypted if Alice and Bob co-
operate. The protocol implementation is shown in Fig. 3.
2. Single-qubit protocol
Instead of using entangled states, reference 44 pro-
posed an N -party QSS protocol that uses a single qubit,
which is easily realizable and scalable compared to the
entanglement-based protocol. On the other hand, this
6protocol completely removes the possibility to share
quantum information in terms of an entangled state.
The information shared is necessarily classical. Ref-
erence 5 demonstrated this protocol. An initial qubit
|x〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 is prepared by party R1, and sent
from R2 to RN sequentially. Each party Ri (i = 1, ...,
N − 1) encodes information by applying a phase ran-
domly chosen from two sets, {0, pi} and {pi/2, 3pi/2},
to the |1〉 component in the qubit |x〉. The party RN
randomly applies phase 0 or pi/2 to the |1〉 component
before measuring the state |±x〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. Thus,
the detection probability of each detector is
PD1 =
1
2
[1 + cos(
N∑
i=1
φi)],
PD2 =
1
2
[1− cos(
N∑
i=1
φi)].
(4)
Half of the time, there is destructive or constructive
interference, when cos(φ1 + · · ·+φN ) = ±1. If all parties
announce which set of phase values their choice belonged
to, then every party knows which detection results are
deterministic. Using the knowledge of which measure-
ment results are deterministic, multiple parties can then
share a secret as follows. If any N −1 parties collaborate
and share their modulating phases, they would be cer-
tain about the phase applied by the Nth party for one
slot of the deterministic measurement. To maintain sta-
bility in the experiment, a bidirectional scheme is applied
to implement a 5-party protocol [5] as shown in Fig. 4.
Alice prepares the initial pulse without phase encoding
and acts as R5 to measure the final reflected state. The
rest of parties encode their information on the way back
from the Faraday mirror (FM), after the pulse is atten-
uated to the single-photon level by the amplitude modu-
lator (AM). This idea is similar to the plug & play QKD
system [45].
B. Hacking
We discuss one type of known attack that may work
for the implementation of each aforementioned QSS pro-
tocol. An external Eve is assumed to be the attacker. If
an external Eve can compromise the security, any inside
attacker (a protocol participant) could also compromise
security and obtain the secret without the cooperation of
the other participants, because inside attackers have at
least as much information as an outside attacker.
1. Blinding attack on entanglement-based implementation
In the entanglement-based QSS scheme mentioned
above, three parties securely share a secret string using a
GHZ state that has inherent correlations among the three
photons. If Eve would like to perform an intercept-resend
1550nm 
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FIG. 4. Single-qubit QSS (reprinted from Ref. 5). Alice
randomly modulates the state, adding a phase of 0 or pi/2.
The rest of parties randomly choose a phase from {0, pi/2,
pi, 3pi/2}. Here, LD denotes a laser diode, ATT denotes an
attenuator, SPD denotes a single-photon detector, CIR de-
notes a circulator, BS denotes a beam splitter, PBS denotes
a polarization beam splitter, PM denotes a phase modulator,
AM denotes an amplitude modulator, FM denotes a Faraday
mirror.
attack via a quantum channel, she would break the ini-
tial correlation between the three entangled photons, and
thus introduce errors [46]. However, the detector blind-
ing attack (see Sec. II B 1) could help Eve steal the shared
secret while introducing no error. Eve performs two in-
dependent detector blinding attacks on Alice’s and Bob’s
detectors. The blinded detectors only click when Al-
ice/Bob chooses the same measurement bases as Eve dur-
ing an intercept-resend attack. Thus, Alice’s and Bob’s
secret strings could be obtained by Eve to let her learn
Charlie’s key. Alternatively, instead of hacking Alice and
Bob, Eve can directly blind Charlie’s detectors to control
the secret key he obtains.
2. Trojan-horse attack on single-qubit implementation
The security of single-qubit QSS follows the proven
BB84 QKD protocol [44]. Similarly to BB84 protocol,
an intercept-resend attack on the QSS introduces 25%
error in the final detection results. However, the imple-
mentation might have side channels that leak information
about state preparation, allowing Eve to learn the shared
secret without disturbing the normal QSS protocol.
In the implementation scheme of single-qubit QSS
shown in Fig. 4, similar to QKD systems, the phase
modulation is implemented by a phase modulator which
may be vulnerable. Thus, the Trojan-horse attack (see
Sec. II B 2) appears to be a high risk, owing to the pass-
through nature of every party except for Alice. Eve could
send strong light to each party, excluding Alice, and then
at the other side of each party receive the light modulated
by the PM. By measuring the phase difference between
7Eve’s original coherent light and the modulated light, she
could read the phase modulation. In this way, Eve could
know the secret shared among the four parties. In gen-
eral, this hacking strategy works for N parties. An attack
on Alice may also be attempted, however, it is more dif-
ficult owing to the presence of SPDs in Alice [47].
IV. SOURCE-INDEPENDENT QUANTUM
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION
Quantum random number generation (QRNG) based
on the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics can
be used to provide pure random numbers, a crucial
resource in cryptography [48]. Similarly to QKD, a
QRNG system also consists of quantum state prepa-
ration and measurement, however, the states are mea-
sured locally without long-distance transmission. Source-
independent (SI) QRNG protocols [17, 49, 50] assume
that the state preparation setup is untrusted, while the
measurement setup is trusted. We survey the protocol in
Ref. 17 and its experimental demonstration.
A. Protocol and implementation
In the SI QRNG protocol, an untrusted party Eve pre-
pares single-qubit states |+〉 and sends them to Alice’s
measurement station [17]. Alice first projects the quan-
tum states into qubits |+〉 and vacuum states, but it is
unclear how to implement this operation in practice. As-
sume that n squashed qubits are obtained during the
operation of the protocol. The resulting single qubits
are then randomly measured either in the X basis, {|+〉,
|−〉}, or the Z basis, {|H〉, |V 〉}. If nx out of the n
squashed qubits are measured in the X basis, they should
be detected as |+〉 ideally. The detection rate for |−〉 is
treated as the estimated error rate ebx. The remaining
nz = n−nx qubits are measured in the Z basis to gener-
ate nz random bits. Alice then extracts the final secure
random bits from nz, which is equivalent to privacy am-
plification in QKD.
The experimental demonstration is shown in Fig. 5.
Weak coherent pulses are prepared with |+〉 polarization
by a linear polarizer (LP) and a polarization controller
(PC1). At Alice’s side, a beam splitter (BS1) with split-
ting ratio 2:98 is used to passively choose the X or Z
basis. In Fig. 5, the upper and lower paths correspond
to the X basis and Z basis respectively. A single-photon
detector is time-division-multiplexed by using four time
delays TD1–TD4. For each coherent state Eve sends, a
click in the first detection slot indicates that Alice chooses
the X basis and correctly detects the incoming pulse as
|+〉, while a click in the second slot indicates a wrong
detection, |−〉, which is used for the error estimation.
Moreover, a click in the third slot indicates that Alice se-
lects the Z basis and obtain the result |H〉, while a click
in the fourth slot indicates the result |V 〉.
Eve
LD
LP
PC1
ATT
BS1
PC2
PC3
PBS1
PBS2
TD4
BS2
BS3
BS4
Alice
TD1
TD2
TD3
SPD
98
2
FIG. 5. Experimental scheme for SI QRNG (reprinted from
Ref. 17). The untrusted party Eve prepares quantum states
and sends them to Alice, who is trusted. Alice then generates
random numbers. Here, LD is a laser diode, LP is a linear
polarizer, PC is a polarization controller, ATT is an optical
attenuator, BS is a beam splitter, PBS is a polarization beam
splitter, TD is a time delay, SPD is a single-photon detector.
B. Hacking
This SI QRNG protocol assumes that the source can
be untrusted, but the measurement station is trusted
and characterized [17]. However, it is not clear how
to guarantee the latter requirement in practice. There-
fore, Eve might be able to prepare fake states to gen-
erate nonrandom numbers. The detector blinding at-
tack (see Sec. II B 1) could force the SPD to work as a
classical detector. Then Eve could send a strong bright
pulse to trigger a detection in the first slot. Then she
sends another bright pulse with either the state |H〉 or
|V 〉 to control the detection in the third or fourth slot.
The attack can result in equal detection rates for |H〉 and
|V 〉, which looks like random clicks to Alice, while being
precisely controlled by Eve. Eve actually thus controls
the bit string.
Another potential issue is the wavelength-dependent
attack, because the splitting ratio of a beam splitter
might be sensitive to the wavelength of the incoming
light (see Sec. II B 1). All four beam splitters in the mea-
surement station might be affected. By controlling the
splitting ratio of BS1 and/or BS4, Eve can bias whether
error checking or random bit generation happens. For
BS2 and BS3, by manipulating the splitting ratio, Eve is
able to partially control the results of error checking and
bit generation. Please note that a wavelength filter alone
will not protect the system from this attack, because Eve
could send bright states to overcome the finite extinction
ratio in the filter’s stopband.
8V. QUANTUM SECURE DIRECT
COMMUNICATION
QSDC transmits secret information directly through
a quantum channel, instead of establishing a secret key
first [51]. The initial QSDC protocol is based on en-
tangled pairs [52–54]. However, entanglement is not a
necessary condition for QSDC. The first single-photon
QSDC protocol, Deng-Long 2004 (DL04), was proposed
in Ref. 55. Recently, researchers started studying the
strict security proof of this DL04 protocol [56]. However,
regarding the practical security, the implementation of
this protocol also needs to be investigated. Also, more
attention may need to be paid to the motivation for se-
cure direct communication.
A. Protocol and implementation
The DL04 protocol contains two phases of channel es-
timation and a phase of secret transmission. The first
channel estimation checks the security of the channel
from Alice to Bob. Alice prepares a sequence of photons
randomly chosen from the set of states |H〉, |V 〉, |+〉,
and |−〉, and sends them to Bob. He randomly selects a
portion of the received photons, and randomly measures
them in the X or the Z basis. Then Bob announces the
measurement results and compares them to Alice’s pre-
pared states to calculate an error rate. Only when the
error rate is lower than a threshold, Alice and Bob trust
the channel and continue to the next step. Bob randomly
selects another small portion of the received photons, and
applies one of two unitary operations to each of them:
U = |0〉 〈1| − |1〉 〈0| or I = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|, i.e., flipping a
state or not. These photons are employed to check the
security of the channel from Bob to Alice. The rest of
the photons received by Bob are used to encode secret
information by randomly applying the operator U or I
to each photon. All these photons are then sent to Alice,
who measures these photons in the preparation bases.
Regarding the photons used for the security check, Al-
ice checks if her measurement result is compatible with
Bob’s operation to estimate the error rate. Once the er-
ror rate is lower than a threshold, they trust the channel
from Bob to Alice. The remaining photons measured in
their preparation bases allow Alice to deterministically
know Bob’s operation, obtaining the secret information.
The protocol is implemented by the setup shown
in Fig. 6 [18]. Alice prepares the initial photon string
and measures the photons encoded by Bob. She first
prepares |H〉 and |V 〉 using two laser diodes. The prepa-
ration and measurement bases are selected by PC1 and
PC2 respectively. Bob encodes his information by PC3.
All the basis choices are controlled by field programmable
gate arrays (FPGAs). The channel from Alice to Bob is
denoted forward channel, and the channel from Bob to
Alice is denoted backward channel. A beamsplitter at
Bob’s side selects a small portion of the received photons,
LD1
ATT
CM
BobAlice
Frequency coding
Delay line
SPD1
FPGA FPGA
PC1
Classical
channelSPD2
PC2
PC3
BSPBS1
PBS2
Forward
Backward
f1
f2
fr
LD2
FIG. 6. QSDC implementation (reprinted from Ref. 18). Al-
ice prepares and measures states, and Bob encodes the secret
message by manipulating the states. Here, LD is a laser diode,
PBS is a polarization beam splitter, ATT is an optical atten-
uator, PC is a polarization controller, BS is a beam splitter,
CM is a control module, FPGA is a field programmable gate
array, SPD is a single-photon detector.
and then a control module is used to check the security of
the forward channel. The control module’s scheme is the
same as the passive measurement station in BB84 QKD
system. A delay line is used to store the photons during
the forward-channel check. To tolerate photon loss dur-
ing secret transmission, a special method named single-
photon frequency encoding is used. Instead of encoding
information on individual photons, this method encodes
information on the spectrum of a sequence of photons.
After Alice detects a sequence of photons and converts
them to a binary bit string, the spectrum can be known
by applying the Fourier transform to the bit string. Dur-
ing the detection, Alice might miss some photons due to
channel loss and imperfect detection efficiency. Fortu-
nately, because the information does not only rely on an
individual photon, but is determined by the spectrum of
the entire sequence, missing some photons just reduces
the signal-to-noise ratio, but the feature of the spectrum
still exists [18]. The calculated spectrum corresponds to
the bit string that is the initial information Bob sent.
B. Hacking
The first phase of the DL04 QSDC protocol, the secu-
rity check of the forward channel, is similar to the raw
key exchange, sifting and error estimation phases in the
BB84 QKD protocol [2]. The security check of the back-
ward channel and secret direct transmission are quantum
versions of the one-time pad, which randomly flips the
bit information [55]. Just as for QKD, the implementa-
tion [18] may contain side channels.
The first potential side channel is that detec-
tors may be attacked by the detector blinding at-
tack (see Sec. II B 1). During the check of the forward
channel, Eve blinds the detectors in the control module
and conducts an attack with fake states [57] to control
Bob’s detection results. Since this attack introduces no
9errors, the security check is passed. During the second
check of the backward channel and information trans-
mission, Eve uses classical optical detectors to measure
her bright pulses modulated by Bob. Since these are
states resent by Eve during the previous phase, Eve could
apply the same basis as in the previous step to know
with certainty what operation Bob performed. Then,
she sends the same states with proper brightness to Al-
ice’s blinded detectors, such that only when Alice selects
the same bases as Eve, Alice obtains detections. This
attack results in full control of Alices measurement out-
comes. Again, no extra errors are introduced. Further-
more, Eve learns the secret information between Alice
and Bob. This breaks the security of QSDC. Please note
that because this implementation uses an active basis
choice (the basis is actively selected by the polarization
controller), Eve’s measurement basis can only match Al-
ice’s/Bob’s measurement basis half the time. However,
when the basis matches the click probability in Bob under
attack can be unity, while his single-photon detection ef-
ficiency is typically much lower than unity [9]. This may
compensate for the extra loss introduced by the attack.
The second possible side channel exists in the polariza-
tion controllers that might be vulnerable to the Trojan-
horse attack (see Sec. II B 2). In this QSDC implemen-
tation [18], Eve can conduct the Trojan-horse attack on
PC1 or PC3. From an attack on PC1, Eve would know
Alice’s basis choice in the state preparation and measure-
ment, as PC2 applies the same basis as PC1. The dif-
ference between the prepared and the measured state is
Bob’s secret information (flip or not). On the other hand,
Bob’s encoded information could be directly known by
hacking PC3 (similarly to Sec. III B 2). Once Eve knows
the original states prepared by Alice or what Bobs mod-
ulation was, she could obtain the secret information.
VI. BLIND QUANTUM COMPUTING
In the future, a quantum computer could be used as
a server that provides quantum computation capability
to remote users, who themselves do not have a quantum
computer and only use simple technology. A key task
is to keep the client’s data and program secret from the
server. Classical blind computing protocols exist [58],
but it can only guarantee computational security [19].
However, taking advantage of quantum mechanics, BQC
is able to provide unconditional security for client’s data
and computation in the quantum computer server [59].
A. Protocol and implementation
BQC is based on entangled multiparticle cluster
states [19]. In the BQC protocol, qubits are first pre-
pared as |θj〉 = (|0〉 + eiθj |1〉)/
√
2 by a client, where θj
is randomly selected from {0, pi/4, ..., 7pi/4}. Then the
single-photon qubits are sent to a quantum server that
Quarter-wave plate
Half-wave plate
BBO crystal
Polarization controller
Polarizing beam splitter
Filter
Coupler
FIG. 7. Proof-of-principle implementation of BQC (reprinted
from Ref. 19). Entangled photon pairs are generated
from non-collinear type-II spontaneous parametric down-
conversion process in BBO crystal. The horizontal and verti-
cal polarization represents |0〉 and |1〉.
entangles them with each other by applying controlled-
phase gates, so that the qubits form a cluster state. Then
the cluster state is measured by the quantum server,
which performs single-qubit measurements in the basis∣∣±δj〉 = (|0〉 + eiδj |1〉)/√2. The measurement basis is
instructed by the client: δj = φj + θj + pirj , where φj
is the desired rotation and rj is randomly chosen from
{0, 1}. Since θj is the initial phase hidden from the
quantum server, the server is not able to calculate the
desired rotation φj from the measurement result. It is
remarkable that for the cluster state, its shape, such as
the dimension, also may leak information about the op-
eration gates. Thus, also the shape of the cluster state
is required to be hidden, which can be accomplished by
choosing, for example, brickwork states [19]. The BQC
protocol then completes a quantum computation while
preserving the client’s privacy.
Theoretically, the client only needs to have a single-
photon source to generate a state |θj〉 and send it to the
server. However, implementing a single-photon source
is challenging so far, as standard parametric down-
conversion sources always also have higher-order emis-
sions, meaning that instead of one pair, two or more pairs
are emitted at the same time. An initial demonstration
of the BQC protocol with current technology is shown
in Fig. 7 [19]. Note that in the current implementation,
entangled pairs are first prepared on the client’s side, and
the cluster state is generated on the server’s side. The
laser beam passes a BBO crystal to first generate the
entangled pair traveling forwards. Then the beam is re-
flected and passes the BBO crystal again to generate the
entangled pair traveling backwards. The initial phase θj
is applied by rotating the angles of half-wave plates and
quarter-wave plates, serving as modulators. Then the
entangled states are sent to the quantum server’s side,
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where a cluster state is generated. The states are mea-
sured in different bases, as instructed by the client. In
this BQC protocol, the setup of the client is relatively
simple, but the setup of the quantum server would have
more capabilities once a real quantum computer is avail-
able. Here we take one type of BQC protocol as an ex-
ample. There also exist other versions of BQC where the
server generates entangled cluster states and the mea-
surements are done by the client [60, 61].
B. Hacking
In the above subsection, a proof-of-principle imple-
mentation of BQC was introduced. Although in the fu-
ture the technology available to implement the quantum
server for BQC will be more mature and comprehensive,
the client setup is already relatively clear. It is foresee-
able that future client station will likely still consist of a
photon source and modulators. Unfortunately, in prac-
tice, any kind of modulator is susceptible to the Trojan-
horse attack [12, 20, 42, 43]. This vulnerability breaks an
important assumption in BQC: the initial phase θj should
be unknown to the untrusted quantum server. Specifi-
cally, regarding the implementation shown in Fig. 7, the
phase modulation is done by the wave plates. The re-
flected light from the wave plates may leak information
about θj . Instead of wave plates, an advanced setup in
the future could be using phase modulators to randomly
modulate the phase θj , which is a technique widely used
in quantum cryptography [5, 6, 62]. Unfortunately, the
Trojan-horse attack might still be applied to phase mod-
ulators, as we have discussed in Sec. II B 2.
Except for imperfect phase modulation, another possi-
ble issue is the photon source itself. For the current ver-
sion of implementation, the entanglement source some-
times might simultaneously emit multiple pairs of en-
tangled states. In this case, Eve could split off a copy
of entangled states from the source. Then measuring
her copy would give Eve information about the state it-
self. Even in future implementations, when ideal single-
photon sources are available, one still needs to pay atten-
tion to state generation. For instance, the BQC proto-
col needs indistinguishable multiple photons [19]. Thus,
careful source design is crucial to avoid any distinguisha-
bility in the generated photons (this can, in principle,
occur in any degree of freedom, for example wavelength).
For other variations of BQC protocols, where the mea-
surements are done on the client’s side [60, 61], attacks
that leak information about the measurement settings are
applicable. So, in a setting where the client uses wave
plates to choose a measurement basis [61], the Trojan-
horse attack could be applied as well.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
An imperfect implementation compromises the secu-
rity promised in theory, as we have argued in Secs. II
to VI. To patch the practical loopholes, we should
consider feasible countermeasures in implementations of
quantum cryptographic protocols. Existing countermea-
sures for QKD and countermeasures under development
may be adaptable to implementations of other crypto-
graphic protocols. However, integrating these consider-
ations into the relevant security proofs is an open chal-
lenge. We now recap countermeasures proposed in the
literature for both the source and measurement parts of
a quantum cryptographic system. We also discuss how
they may be applied to the protocols surveyed in this
Article.
A. Countermeasures against source imperfection
Properly implementing the quantum-state source in
the above protocols requires that any other degrees of
freedom are uncorrelated with the degree of freedom
where information is encoded. However, for the states
prepared by different laser diodes (see Sec. II A 1), the
laser diodes may show the inherent difference in the spec-
trum and emission time. These types of difference hint
which laser diode is on, i.e., which state is prepared. The
mismatch in a certain degree of freedom could be a side
channel for Eve who tries to distinguish different quan-
tum states [32, 33]. To avoid this inherent mismatch
among different laser diodes, quantum state preparation
could use only one laser diode followed by optical mod-
ulators (Fig. 8), as shown in many QKD implementa-
tions [63–65]. The laser diode generates identical pulses.
Then different states are modulated by a phase modula-
tor [63], intensity modulator [64], or polarization modu-
lator [65].
The external modulation method could be ap-
plied to the implementation of double-receiver
QDS (see Sec. II A 1). However, this modification
might open another loophole: the Trojan-horse attack
on the modulators. Once a system uses a modulator,
countermeasures against Trojan-horse attack are re-
quired. For a unidirectional system that only sends
states from one party to another but never back, a
possible countermeasure is adding enough isolation
between the modulator and the output port connected
to the quantum channel, as shown in Fig. 8. The amount
of isolation is defined by the combination of bidirectional
attenuation from attenuators, the unidirectional atten-
uation from isolators and total reflection probability
from lasers and modulators. For example, in a BB84
QKD system, the isolation has been quantified as the
following [66]. Suppose Eve injects pulsed light into the
party preparing the state. The injected power is limited
by the maximum power transmitted safely through
standard single-mode fiber (assumed to be 12.8 W in
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LD M ATT ISO
FIG. 8. The scheme of countermeasures against source im-
perfections. To eliminate the mismatch among different laser
diodes, a single laser diode LD followed by a modulator M
can be used. The following attenuator ATT and isolator ISO
provide sufficient isolation to prevent the Trojan-horse attack
in a unidirectional system. Here, G denotes a modulation
signal generator.
Ref. 66). The amount of reflection then is obtained
after the injected light is attenuated by the system
isolation. Taking this amount of reflection into account
in the calculation of the key rate, one could obtain the
final secure key rate. To obtain a key rate under the
Trojan-horse attack that is close to the rate without an
attack, 170 dB isolation is required [66].
A similar methodology could be applied to single-
receiver QDS, QSDC, and BQC, which may be vulnera-
ble to the Trojan-horse attack. In each implementation,
attenuators and isolators could be added between the
modulators and system output, and the reflectivity of
modulator and laser diodes should be quantified. Then
the required amount of isolation should be calculated ac-
cording to the security models of the corresponding pro-
tocol as has already been done for QKD [66]. The chosen
amount of isolation should maintain the system’s secu-
rity properties. We notice that in the implementation of
single-receiver QDS in Ref 26, an attenuator is already
included to weaken the output power to single-photon
level. However, this amount of attenuation is probably
not sufficient to provide isolation to counter the Trojan-
horse attack.
For a bidirectional plug & play QSS system
(see Sec. III A 2) and pass-through QSDC (see Sec. V),
the system’s isolation in the previous countermeasure is
not applicable, because it would block transmission of the
states. In the bidirectional system, single-photon moni-
tors would be needed to observe the incoming light [42].
It is not clear if implementing such countermeasure se-
curely is realistic. Nevertheless, a patent by Trifonov and
Vig [67] proposes a scheme against Trojan-horse attack
with a single-photon watchdog detector. This counter-
measure could be adapted for the single-qubit QSS imple-
mentation. Alice could employ a watchdog detector for
the received light. The rest of parties in the scheme could
use two watchdog detectors to observe two fiber connec-
tion ports at each side of the PM. Any alarm would abort
the protocol. Please note that the single-photon detec-
tor might be vulnerable to the detector blinding attack.
Thus, a corresponding countermeasure against detector
control attacks is necessary, which is discussed in the next
subsection.
B. Countermeasures against measurement
imperfection
In a party that makes measurements, characteristics
of passive optical components, such as beam splitters,
might be sensitive to wavelength. That is, the compo-
nent’s behavior for unexpected wavelengths may devi-
ate from what is assumed. To provide practical security,
wavelength dependence should be eliminated. A possi-
ble method is using a wavelength filter to block unex-
pected wavelengths, and only pass a narrow range around
the working wavelength [66]. In the implementation of
double-receiver QDS (see Sec. II A 1), this filter could
be added before the beam splitter in Bob and Charlie,
i.e., right at their input ports. The filter’s transmis-
sion should be verified in a wide range of wavelengths.
However, there is a limitation to this approach: Eve can
simply increase her light power to pass through the stop-
band. Therefore, as a more robust countermeasure, we
suggest utilizing active basis choice in the measurement
station.
Another major vulnerability in measurement setups is
imperfections in single-photon detectors (see Sec. II B 1).
A proposed countermeasure for QKD systems is calibrat-
ing the characteristics of detectors in real time, avoiding
Eve’s manipulation [68]. In this receiver design, a cali-
brated light source is locally included in the measurement
unit, in combination with several other countermeasures.
By randomly activating this local source to send photons
to the detectors, the corresponding detection efficiency
can be calibrated during the system operation. The char-
acterized detection efficiency can then be used in the se-
curity proof to calculate the secure key rate. A similar
design might be applicable to measurement stations in
the other quantum cryptographic protocols. However,
incorporating the calibration procedure into their secu-
rity models should be studied in each case.
Another approach to entirely avoid the effect of imper-
fect detectors and other measurement imperfections are
measurement-device-independent (MDI) quantum cryp-
tographic protocols [69], such as MDI QKD [70], MDI
QSS [71] and MDI QDS [72, 73]. In the MDI proto-
cols, the party making measurements is untrusted: there
are no security assumptions regarding the measurements.
Even if Eve makes the measurements, the secret infor-
mation (provided the protocol produces it) can still be
distributed among the rest of the authenticated parties.
This is a promising idea to avoid security loopholes re-
lated to the measurements. However, state preparation
remains trusted and still needs to be carefully designed
to avoid loopholes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have surveyed implementations of five types of
quantum cryptographic primitives. As our analysis
shows, these quantum cryptographic systems might have
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security loopholes similar to QKD systems, because they
use similar optical components. These imperfections
would compromise the security properties of each quan-
tum cryptographic protocol (see summary in Table I).
We discuss implementations of these protocols, showing
that practical insecurity is a common issue in the imple-
mentation of quantum cryptography in general, not only
in QKD. In other words, a gap between perfect theory
and imperfect practice generally exists in quantum cryp-
tography.
Our analysis of imperfections in this survey has been
intended to reveal a broad picture. Detailed analysis of
imperfections for each specific implementation should be
done in the future. Once the existence of practical loop-
holes has been noticed, it becomes essential to bridge the
gap between theory and practice. One should consider
countermeasures when implementing existing protocols
or designing new quantum cryptographic protocols that
tolerate practical imperfections. Fortunately, these ap-
proaches appear to be feasible. However, integrating im-
perfections into security proofs [28, 66, 74] is a significant
challenge, which should be addressed in future studies.
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